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Classical theories of skill acquisition propose that automatization (i.e., performance requires 26 
progressively less attention as experience is acquired) is a defining characteristic of expertise 27 
in a variety of domains (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967). Automaticity is believed to enhance 28 
smooth and efficient skill execution by allowing performers to focus on strategic elements of 29 
performance rather than on the mechanical details that govern task implementation (see 30 
Williams & Ford, 2008). By contrast, conscious processing (i.e., paying conscious attention 31 
to one’s action during motor execution) has been found to disrupt skilled movement and 32 
performance proficiency (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001). On the basis of this evidence, 33 
researchers have tended to extol the virtues of automaticity. However, few researchers have 34 
considered the wide range of empirical evidence which indicates that highly automated 35 
behaviours can, on occasion, lead to a series of errors that may prove deleterious to skilled 36 
performance. Therefore, the purpose of the current paper is to highlight the perils, rather than 37 
the virtues, of automaticity. We draw on Reason’s (1990) classification scheme of everyday 38 
errors to show how an over-reliance on automated procedures may lead to three specific 39 
performance errors (i.e., mistakes, slips and lapses) in a variety of skill domains (e.g., sport, 40 
dance, music). We conclude by arguing that skilled performance requires the dynamic 41 
interplay of automatic processing and conscious processing in order to avoid performance 42 
errors and to meet the contextually-contingent demands that characterise competitive 43 
environments in a range of skill domains. 44 
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The perils of automaticity 50 
 51 
A key tenet of classical theories of skill acquisition (e.g., Fitts & Posner, 1967) is that 52 
performance becomes automatized (i.e., requires progressively fewer attentional resources) as 53 
a function of practice. Automatic processes are believed to be ‘fast, stimulus-driven and 54 
characterised by a lack of intention, attention and awareness’ (Saling & Phillips, 2007, p. 2). 55 
By contrast, controlled processes (which are typically portrayed as conscious and effortful in 56 
nature, Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) are believed to be too slow to allow skilled performers to 57 
initiate action sequences when environmental or internal conditions demand immediate 58 
responses. Nevertheless, it is thought that this mode of processing may prove beneficial to 59 
novice performers (as they need to attend to skill execution in a step-by-step manner) and to 60 
experts when they are faced with unique situational demands or attenuated movement 61 
patterns (see Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002; Beilock & Gray, 2007). 62 
However, when performing routine and familiar tasks (such as dribbling a soccer ball 63 
through a series of cones), conscious control has been found to be highly disruptive to expert 64 
movement and performance proficiency (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2001; Jackson, Ashford, & 65 
Norsworthy, 2006). In these latter situations, instead of consciously deliberating over the 66 
course of action to be taken, experts are believed to possess a repertoire of “situational 67 
discriminations” (i.e., well-worn neural pathways built from extensive experience with a wide 68 
variety of responses to each of the situations he/she has encountered) which allows them to 69 
intuitively see how to achieve their goal. Accordingly, the expert no longer needs to rely on 70 
rules or “verbally articulable propositions” as the skill is thought to have become “so much a 71 
part of him that he need be no more aware of it than he is of his own body” (Dreyfus & 72 
Dreyfus, 1986, p. 30). 73 
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In complex cognitive tasks such as chess, automaticity allows skilled players to 74 
benefit from parallel processing which enables them to process the relational position of all 75 
pieces on a board simultaneously. By contrast, less-skilled players process the relational 76 
position of each piece one at a time (i.e., serially; see Reingold, Charness, Schultetus, & 77 
Stamp, 2001). In sport, automated processing of the mechanical details of a skill (e.g. the 78 
backhand drive in tennis) enables the expert player to focus on strategic features of 79 
performance (e.g., the precise target for a cross-court backhand drive). Additionally, skilled 80 
athletes’ response speed and efficiency is enhanced by processes such as advance cue 81 
utilisation (i.e., athlete’s ability to make accurate predictions based on contextual information 82 
early in an action sequence; Williams, Davids, & Williams, 1999) and visuospatial pattern 83 
recognition (the ability to detect patterns of play early in their development) allowing them to 84 
respond intuitively in dynamic environments where time constraints provide little opportunity 85 
to deliberate and plan one’s course of action (for a review, see Williams & Ford, 2008).  86 
On the basis of the preceding evidence it is perhaps understandable that psychologists, 87 
skill acquisition specialists, and cognitive neuroscientists have focused on extolling the 88 
virtues of automaticity in facilitating expert performance. However, as we shall argue below, 89 
these perspectives ignore a wide range of evidence which indicates that highly routinized 90 
behaviours can, on occasion, lead to errors that are likely to prove deleterious to performance 91 
proficiency in a variety of skill domains. Therefore, the purpose of the present paper is to 92 
highlight the perils, rather than the virtues, of automaticity. 93 
What exactly constitutes a performance error? Reason (1990) conducted extensive 94 
research on the psychology of human error and argued that the latter term “encompasses all 95 
those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve 96 
its intended outcome, and when those failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some 97 
chance agency” (p. 9). He further suggested that correct performance and systematic errors 98 
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are ‘two sides of the same cognitive balance sheet’ and that an analysis of ‘recurrent error 99 
forms is essential to achieving a proper understanding of the largely hidden processes that 100 
govern thought and action’ (p. 2). Unfortunately, researchers have yet to conduct a systematic 101 
analysis of the error forms that might occur during the performance of skilled motor action. 102 
In seeking to address this issue the current paper draws on a wide range of empirical evidence 103 
in order to argue that there are a number of different motor and cognitive tasks where a 104 
reliance on automaticity is ‘not desired for fear that it might lead to error’ (Norman & 105 
Shallice, 1986, p. 3). In doing so, we draw on Reason’s (1990) classification scheme of 106 
everyday errors to show how automaticity may lead to errors in performance in a variety of 107 
skill domains (e.g., sport, dance, music).  108 
At the outset, Reason (1990) distinguished between performance errors based on 109 
mistakes in planning and those based on lapses or slips in the course of execution. In the 110 
former case, errors might arise from a lack of knowledge, inadequate or incorrect 111 
information, or from the misapplication of rules. Reason (1990) defined mistakes as 112 
‘deficiencies or failures in the judgemental and/or inferential processes involved in the 113 
selection of an objective or in the specification of the means to achieve it, irrespective of 114 
whether or not the actions directed by this decision-scheme run according to plan’ (p. 9). 115 
Reason (1990) believed that mistakes can be subdivided into (a) failures of expertise, where 116 
some preestablished plan or problem solving is applied inappropriately and (b) a lack of 117 
expertise, where the individual, not having an appropriate ‘off-the-shelf’ routine, is forced to 118 
‘work out a plan of action from first principles, relying upon whatever relevant knowledge he 119 
or she currently possesses’ (p. 12).  120 
By contrast, slips and lapses in the course of execution are most likely to occur during 121 
heavily practiced or routine actions. According to Reason (1990) slips and lapses are ‘errors 122 
which result from some failure in the execution and/or storage of an action sequence, 123 
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regardless of whether or not the plan which guided them was adequate to achieve its 124 
objective’ (p. 9). Finally, Reason argued that slips (e.g., slips of the tongue) are more likely to 125 
be observable than lapses (although, as we will proceed to argue later, this may not always be 126 
true in the case of skilled performance) – as the latter form of error characterises more covert 127 
forms of action that may only be apparent to the person who experiences them. Reason 128 
(1990) argued that slips generally occur as a result of inattention (when somebody fails to 129 
make a necessary check during action) but that they can also be caused by overattention – 130 
which occurs when we attend to performance at an inappropriate point in an automated action 131 
sequence. Lapses typically involve failures of memory so a musician may, for example, miss 132 
or forget a crucial turning point in a piece (i.e., where they are supposed to alter the 133 
expressivity of their play; see Chaffin & Logan, 2006). The performer is likely to 134 
instantaneously recognise this lapse but the error may not be apparent to the audience.  135 
 Empirical evidence and phenomenological description suggests that an overreliance 136 
on automated responses might lead to planning and execution errors/failures in a variety of 137 
complex and demanding tasks across various skill domains (e.g., Memmert, Unkelbach, & 138 
Ganns, 2010). We draw on this evidence to argue that automaticity is not an all-or-nothing 139 
phenomenon and that there may be ‘excessive’ amounts of it (i.e., the mindlessness that 140 
appears to characterise classical conceptualizations of automaticity; see Kahneman & Henik, 141 
1981; MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988) that can lead to mistakes, slips, and lapses in skilled 142 
performance. First, we show how excessive automaticity might cause errors by interfering 143 
with effective planning/decision making not only in skill domains where time is available 144 
(such as chess) but also in fast-paced/open-skilled sports (where intuitive responses are 145 
generally considered to be most effective) that occur in environments characterised by severe 146 
time constraints. Second, we show how automaticity might cause slips in performance by 147 
invoking ironic processes or habit lag during on-line skill execution and demonstrate how 148 
PERILS OF AUTOMATICITY  7 
 
 
slips might arise when the performer is overly-reliant on automated processes during the 149 
performance of dangerous or technically demanding motor tasks.  150 
Third, we argue that excessive automaticity can cause lapses in performance by (1) 151 
hindering performers’ ability to react flexibly in dynamically unfolding performance 152 
environments and (2) by reducing a performer’s capacity for expressivity. The paper 153 
concludes by drawing on Christensen, Sutton, and McIlwain’s (in press) ‘mesh theory’ to 154 
argue that skilled performance requires the dynamic interplay of automatic processing and 155 
cognitive control in order to avoid performance errors and to meet the contextually-156 
contingent demands that characterise competitive environments in a range of skill domains.  157 
Errors resulting from mistakes in planning 158 
Let us start by considering how automaticity might lead to errors during the decision 159 
making process. Researchers have coined the phrase the einstellung effect to describe the 160 
phenomena whereby skilled chess players make mistakes in positions where familiar 161 
solutions are present (see Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008). These mistakes occur when prior 162 
knowledge/experience or domain specific knowledge interferes with how we solve a current 163 
problem. Here, prior exposure to similar problems may actually have a negative influence on 164 
performance as this experience triggers a familiar but inappropriate solution and prevents 165 
alternative solutions being considered (Kaplan & Simon, 1990; MacGregor, Ormerod, & 166 
Chronicle, 2001). At first glance, this idea might seem somewhat counterintuitive given the 167 
wide range of empirical evidence which indicates that ‘stimulus familiarity and domain-168 
specific knowledge acquired through extensive and deliberate practice underlie the superior 169 
performance of experts relative to their less-skilled counterparts’ (Ellis & Reingold, 2014, p. 170 
1). Nevertheless, evidence from studies on chess (e.g., Bilalić et al. 2008, 2010; Reingold, 171 
Charness, Pomplun, & Stampe, 2001) and medicine (Croskerry, 2003; Gordon & Franklin, 172 
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2003) reveals that expert performers may succumb to the negative impact of prior experience 173 
and stimulus familiarity. To illustrate, Biliać et al. (2008) used eye-tracking technology to 174 
study the einstellung effect in chess experts. In this study, participants were required to find a 175 
checkmate with as few moves as possible. The researchers manipulated board positions so 176 
that there were two possible solutions: a familiar five-move sequence and a less well known 177 
three move sequence. Having identified the familiar pattern the chess players reported that 178 
they were still looking for a better solution. However, their eye patterns showed that they 179 
continued to focus on features of the problem related to the solution they had already 180 
generated. Biliać et al. (2008) speculated that the familiar pattern activated a schema in 181 
memory which ensures that attentional focus is directed to information relevant to the 182 
activated schema. As a result, the chess player focuses on information consistent with the 183 
activated schema and ignores contradictory information. This merely strengthens their 184 
conviction that they have chosen the correct schema and means that they are less likely to 185 
consider alternative options.  186 
Having considered how automaticity might result in tactical decision making errors in 187 
chess we now consider this issue in a sporting context. Furley, Memmert and Heller (2010) 188 
examined how inattentional blindness influences decision making in a real-world basketball 189 
task based on the premise that there are both costs and benefits associated with the automated 190 
processing of task-relevant stimuli. Inattentional blindness refers to a phenomenon whereby 191 
participants who are engaged in attentionally demanding tasks “often fail to perceive an 192 
unexpected object, even if it appears at fixation” (Mack & Rock, 1998, p. 14). In sport this 193 
phenomenon might cause the performer to miss an unexpected event or fail to detect 194 
important cues. To test skilled athletes’ susceptibility to this experience, Furley et al. 195 
examined whether basketball players would fail to pass to an unmarked player in a computer 196 
based sport task if they already held a representation of an alternative player in working 197 
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memory. Specifically, the task required participants to decide who to pass to in a basketball 198 
situation photographed from their own perspective. Here, participants (acting as an attacker) 199 
were confronted by either one defender (who could occupy two potential positions) or two 200 
defenders (who could occupy three potential positions) in the stimulus display while one of 201 
their teammates was always left unguarded. Results showed that participants’ attention was 202 
indeed biased towards certain teammates that resemble internal templates that are being held 203 
in working memory. Furley et al. suggested that the attention-demanding task may have 204 
automatically triggered an internalized production rule (“if-then” statements that describe 205 
what action should be executed if a designated condition is met). As a result, performers 206 
formed an intention to pass to a certain player, and subsequently completed that pass, even 207 
though it may not have been the best option available (as determined by expert ratings). This 208 
problem might be exacerbated when there are more objects in the visual display (e.g., more 209 
teammates available to pass to) as this results in greater competition between visual stimuli 210 
which are competing for limited attentional resources. 211 
 Furley et al sought to explain these findings by suggesting that certain coaching 212 
practices lead players to automatically trigger “if-then” rules. For example, if the defence 213 
responds by doing A, then you should do B; if they respond in manner C, then you should do 214 
D. Coaches are likely to utilise this mode of instruction in order to circumvent performers’ 215 
limited processing capacities by directing their focus of attention to what they consider to be 216 
information-rich areas in a visual field. While such attention-guiding instructions often help, 217 
they may also lead to error. Specifically, they may hamper performance by inducing an 218 
attentional set (i.e., the prioritisation of certain stimuli; see Furley et al. 2010) and, as such, 219 
may help explain the preceding results (also see Memmert, Simons, & Grimme, 2009) 220 
indicating that offensive players fail to detect and subsequently pass to an unguarded 221 
teammate (i.e., one who is free and unchallenged by a defensive player) because that 222 
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individual is not part of a specific offensive play and so is not factored into the decision 223 
making process. This effect resembles a form of confirmation bias (i.e., the seeking or 224 
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs or expectations) which will 225 
mean that the expert takes notice of, and focuses on, information that validates and confirms 226 
their expectations.  227 
Of course, we need to recognise the important role that attentional sets play in guiding 228 
skilled performance. Without a repertoire of automatic responses, it would be extremely 229 
difficult for a performer (particularly one who is engaged in a dynamic environment where 230 
decisions must be made rapidly) to consider all or even a great number of the 231 
possibilities/options available to them. To circumvent these attentional demands performers 232 
are likely to consider options that have been intuitively generated or those that they have been 233 
directed to by a coach’s instructions (perhaps in a pre-game scenario or even as the game 234 
unfolds). However, we need to consider why such automatic processing may hinder 235 
attentional flexibility (i.e., the ability to engage, disengage attention on various locations in 236 
space) causing the performer to miss important cues/game-related information. Answering 237 
this question might help coaches devise training regimes that prevent some of these errors 238 
(even if it is unreasonable to think that all could be eliminated).  239 
Furley et al (2010) argued that attentional sets might also prevent performers from 240 
adopting an ‘expecting-the-unexpected’ strategy (Pesce, Tessitore, Casella, Pirritano, & 241 
Capranica, 2007) which helps performers zoom out their visuospatial attention and process a 242 
wider array of stimuli. In fact, evidence suggests that skilled performers can exert 243 
endogenous control on automatic attentional processes (see Jacoby, Ste-Marie, & Toth, 1993; 244 
Pesce-Anzeneder & Bösel, 1998) and are required to do so because open skilled sports are 245 
characterised by ever-changing conditions which require the flexible allocation of attention. 246 
In these situations performers must be able to utilise selective attention (i.e., the ability to 247 
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limit incoming information in order to focus processing on specific stimuli) – a cognitive 248 
process which allows them to disengage quickly from an incorrectly cued spatial location and 249 
reorient attention to a correct location (Hodgins & Adair, 2010). Here, higher order control 250 
might allow performers to focus on attentional sets in order to meet specific task 251 
requirements (e.g., following a coach’s instructions to exploit an opponent’s defensive 252 
weaknesses) whilst retaining an overall awareness so that one can eschew these instructions 253 
in order to react appropriately in a dynamically unfolding environment. Unfortunately, 254 
excessive automaticity appears to render performers incapable of utilising such attentional 255 
flexibility.  256 
Errors that result from slips in the course of execution 257 
We now consider how automatic processes might lead to errors during on-line skill 258 
execution. Evidence from a range of studies demonstrates that under conditions of mental 259 
load or stress automatic processes that monitor the failure of our conscious intentions can, 260 
ironically, create that failure during skilled performance (Wheatley & Wegner, 2001). 261 
Wheatley and Wegner refer to such processes as “ironic processes”. Ironic processes 262 
represent errors in performance because although the performer may have the correct plan or 263 
intention (e.g., a penalty taker in soccer may intend to place a spot kick beyond the reach of a 264 
goalkeeper by aiming for the upper corner of the net), automatic processes may lead to errors 265 
in task execution (i.e., by causing him/her to focus on what should be avoided, that is, hitting 266 
the ball close to the goalkeeper). Wegner’s (1994) theory of ironic processes of mental 267 
control (i.e., people’s ability to implement their intentions successfully) postulates that self-268 
instructions not to carry out certain acts – under various forms of mental load (e.g., anxiety) - 269 
can lead to the individual behaving or thinking (through the prioritisation of automated 270 
processes) in the very manner that he or she had sought to avoid. In explaining this latter 271 
phenomenon Wegner (1994) referred to two hypothesised processes that work together to 272 
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maintain mental control: the operating process and the monitoring process. The “operating 273 
process” searches for items that are in line with the desired goal or state. In contrast, the 274 
“monitoring process” is less cognitively demanding and identifies signals that one has failed 275 
to achieve the desired state. Wegner (1994) argued that an increase in mental load (e.g., as a 276 
result of anxiety) will reduce the attentional resources available to the operating process, 277 
resulting in the contents of the monitoring process (now unchecked by the operating process) 278 
becoming prioritised. As a result, the monitoring process activates the very thoughts or 279 
actions the performer had sought to avoid. 280 
Empirical support for the theory of ironic processes has been found in a number of 281 
studies (e.g., Bakker, Oudejans, Binsch, & Van Der Kamp, 2006; Binsch, Oudejans, Bakker, 282 
& Savelsbergh, 2009; Woodman & Davis, 2008). For example, Dugdale and Eklund (2003) 283 
found that skilled dancers demonstrated more unwanted movements on a static balance task 284 
when instructed to try not to wobble than when they were simply asked to hold the wobble 285 
board steady. One might be inclined to explain this outcome in terms of Wulf’s research on 286 
the benefits of adopting an external versus internal focus; however, another explanation is 287 
that via ironic processes led the dancers to do the very thing that they had sought to avoid. In 288 
another study, Binsch, Oudejans, Bakker, Hoozemans & Savelsbergh (2010), found that 289 
experienced footballers showed lapses in mental control (i.e., ironic performance) during a 290 
penalty kick task when instructed to shoot as accurately as possible whilst remaining careful 291 
not to shoot within reach of the goalkeeper. Ironic effects were accompanied by shorter final 292 
fixations on the target area (i.e., the open goal space). Research has shown that a longer 293 
fixation on the target prior to and during aiming is a characteristic of high levels of skill and 294 
accuracy (see Vine, Moore & Wilson, 2014, for a review).  295 
Binsch et al. put forward two explanations as to why these ironic effects may have 296 
occurred. First, for some participants, their initial fixation on the keeper may have lasted too 297 
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long for them to dedicate a sufficiently lengthy fixation on the open goal space. Second, the 298 
remaining participants may have dedicated an insufficiently long final fixation on the open 299 
goal space as they subsequently returned their gaze to the keeper. With the former group, the 300 
negative instruction not to aim within reach of the keeper may have caused the word ‘keeper’ 301 
to remain within conscious awareness meaning that it was difficult for the performers to 302 
disengage their visual fixation from this stimuli. In the latter group the word also lingered in 303 
their cognitive system and left insufficient time for a proper final fixation on the target. 304 
Together, these results demonstrate that automatic processes can lead to the very performance 305 
errors that the athlete had sought to avoid. It is, however, important to note that, in contrast to 306 
ironic behaviour, a number of studies have found that instructions can result in 307 
overcompensating, for example, missing a golf putt to the right of the target when one has 308 
been instructed not to miss to the left (see Beilock, Afremow, Rabe & Carr, 2001; Toner, 309 
Moran, & Jackson, 2013). Further research is therefore required to establish the prevalence of 310 
ironic processes as examples of automaticity-induced errors amongst skilled performers. 311 
Nevertheless, there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that rather than alerting the 312 
performer to a failure of conscious intentions, automatic processes may actually activate 313 
thoughts that prove deleterious to performance proficiency.  314 
“Habit lag” appears to represent another intrusive-like error which occurs when the 315 
automatization process proves to be dysfunctional. According to Mannell and Duthie (1975) 316 
“habit lag” may occur ‘when an automatized response, no longer appropriate in a given 317 
situation, is nonetheless emitted counter to the intentions of the performer, thus disrupting a 318 
complex motor performance’ (p. 74). In this case, “habit” involves an automatized response 319 
while “lag” refers to the persistence of an old, outmoded response. Under certain conditions, 320 
habit lag may actually result in the accidental performance of the undesirable response. For 321 
example, a performer may inhibit the undesirable response by deliberately and consciously 322 
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substituting it with a more desirable one but habit lag may arise when conditions are 323 
demanding or require attentional resources to be simultaneously divided between tasks. Fitts 324 
and Posner (1967) were amongst the first authors to describe this phenomenon when they 325 
reported anecdotal evidence which indicated that pilots who have learnt how to operate the 326 
controls in one cockpit, and subsequently moved on to operating in another have, under 327 
emergency conditions, reverted to old habits with catastrophic consequences. In this situation, 328 
the pilots may have stopped thinking about the new operational procedures and reverted back 329 
to the outmoded or ‘ingrained’ response pattern. Mannell and Duthie (1975) tested the habit 330 
lag construct by examining whether outmoded automatized responses would persist in a task 331 
requiring participants to perform two motor responses simultaneously in response to a 332 
televised display. Following a visual discrimination task, participants performed a task 333 
involving a repetitive lever response. Results revealed that ‘automatized participants’ (who 334 
performed the discrimination and the original lever response) committed substantially more 335 
errors than the nonautomatized group (who performed only the discrimination response). The 336 
authors argued that the attentional demand required from the discrimination task may have 337 
reduced attention to the automatized response for a substantial period of time thus facilitating 338 
habit lag. These responses occurred in spite of the performers’ best efforts to inhibit the old 339 
behaviour – a finding which emphasises the persistence of automatized action.    340 
Although few studies have examined how habit lag might influence skilled motor 341 
action this phenomenon does appear to resemble the errors that arise due to perseverance in 342 
the Wisconsin card sorting task (Kaplan, Şengör, Gürvit, Genç, & Güzeliş, 2006) or the A-343 
not-B error in studies of infant and toddler search behaviour (Ahmed & Ruffman, 1998). But 344 
how might habit lag manifest itself in the sporting context? Skilled performers going through 345 
a period of technical change may be particularly susceptible to this undesirable outcome 346 
(Carson & Collins, 2011). Here, performers seeking to replace an old, inefficient movement 347 
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pattern (identified by a coach or on the basis of self-regulation of one’s actions) with a more 348 
proficient one, may find that the old habit can be difficult to exorcise and can remain present 349 
as ‘a ghost...of a stable solution in the attractor outlet’ (Huys, Daffertshofer, & Beek, 2009, p 350 
359). These performers might find that, despite their best efforts, the old movement pattern 351 
remains stubbornly difficult to inhibit during on-line skill execution. This might occur when a 352 
coach or instructor fails to create sufficient ‘noise’ in the motor system by neglecting to 353 
create competition between the pre-existing stable state and the task to be learned (i.e., the 354 
current technique vs. the desired technique; see Carson & Collins, 2011).  355 
Next we consider the errors that might occur when the skilled performer relies on 356 
automaticity during the on-line performance of tasks that are considered to be dangerous or 357 
technically demanding. One might argue that errors/action slips that arise whilst performing 358 
relatively simple tasks, such as reading or typing, are unlikely to be particularly harmful to 359 
one’s health or wellbeing. By contrast, errors that occur during trapeeze acts, gymnastics or 360 
race car driving can be lethal. We argue that performers in these skill domains carry out 361 
activities which are so inherently complex, and potentially dangerous if movements are 362 
performed incorrectly, that actions cannot become wholly automatic. It is important to 363 
consider the latter possibility in light of recent perspectives in the sport psychology and skill 364 
acquisition literature that have encouraged skilled performers to promote automatic 365 
functioning by adopting an external focus of attention (i.e., focusing on the effects of one’s 366 
movements on the environment; see Wulf, 2013). To explain, Wulf and her colleagues have 367 
produced a huge volume of evidence (for a review see Wulf, 2013) demonstrating that an 368 
external focus of attention (e.g., attending to the trajectory of a baseball as it leaves one’s 369 
bat), will lead to a more automatic mode of control (across skill domains and skill levels) 370 
than an internal focus of attention (i.e., focusing on the movement of one’s limbs). Wulf 371 
(2013) has argued that an internal focus constrains the automatic control processes that would 372 
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normally regulate the movement while an external focus allows the motor system to more 373 
naturally self-organize. For example, Wulf, McNevin and Shea (2001) found that a group of 374 
participants instructed to adopt an internal focus produced higher balance errors on a dynamic 375 
balance task (stabilometer) when compared to the performance of an external focus of 376 
attention group. The results revealed that the external group demonstrated lower probe 377 
reaction times (a measure of attentional demands, and hence, the extent to which a movement 378 
is automatized) than the internal focus group. Although these findings point to the efficacy of 379 
an external focus (especially with relatively simple motor tasks) Wulf (2008) has 380 
acknowledged that there might be a ‘limit to the performance-enhancing effects of external 381 
focus instructions for top-level performers’ (p. 323).  382 
Wulf (2008) reached this conclusion after discovering that an external focus did not 383 
enhance movement efficiency (relative to a normal focus condition and to an internal focus 384 
condition) when Cirque Du Soleil performers were required to balance on an inflated rubber 385 
disk. It is important to note that these performers carry out extraordinarily dangerous and 386 
daring feats of acrobatic brilliance which have, on occasions, led to severe injury and even 387 
fatalities (see Zuckerman, 2013). In seeking to explain her findings Wulf (2008) argued that 388 
performance in the “normal condition” (which required participants to stand still) would be 389 
governed by the highest control level. That is, as an action becomes automated it starts to be 390 
monitored at progressively higher levels of control. So, for a skilled golfer, hitting a towering 391 
draw (i.e., right-to-left trajectory) would represent a high-level goal while the mechanical 392 
steps required to achieve it (e.g., creating an in-to-out swing plane) would be represented at a 393 
lower level. In Wulf’s (2008) study, requiring elite acrobats to focus on minimizing the 394 
movement of the disk (external focus) or their feet (internal focus) may have directed them to 395 
a lower level goal and disrupted the ‘finely tuned, reflexive control mechanisms that normally 396 
control their balance’ (p. 323). Performance in the normal condition was characterised by 397 
PERILS OF AUTOMATICITY  17 
 
 
more rapid adjustments than performance in the external and internal conditions. By adopting 398 
their typical focus under normal conditions (no manipulation check was employed so we 399 
don’t know precisely what this focus may have involved) performers could compensate for 400 
perturbations of the disk’s center of pressure by relying on reflex-type control. In the normal 401 
condition, instead of performers relying on some reflex-like response (which is likely to be 402 
mindless or intuitive) they may have drawn on a highly developed kinaesthetic awareness of 403 
their movement efficiency which allows them to rapidly identify (even in the midst of on-line 404 
skill execution) features of movement which require alteration. In fact, it would seem that 405 
attending to performance in these situations is important if one wishes to avoid performance 406 
errors.  407 
Evidence to support this proposal can be found in a range of studies. For example, an 408 
elite acrobatic athlete in Hauw’s (2009) study recalled the following situation when 409 
performance went awry: ‘there was a second there where I told myself I was doing well and I 410 
was almost done…and so I relaxed and on the eight, I made the error’ (p. 349). Hauw and 411 
Durand (2007) argued that performers experienced this state when they ‘fell into a constant 412 
rhythm in their actions that sometimes led to a loss of attention’ (p. 178). Similarly, Wiersma 413 
(2014) completed phenomenological interviews with elite big-wave surfers and found that 414 
they navigated their focus of attention to ensure that they were simultaneously aware of what 415 
was happening in front of (e.g., the contours and bumps of the water), and behind (e.g., the 416 
sound of what the wave was doing), their board so that they react accordingly. The type of 417 
awareness required in such situations would not involve the computationally demanding 418 
process of analysing each step-by-step component of the desired action but instead requires 419 
the performer to attend to certain cues, or kinesthetic sensations (see Ilundáin-Agurruza, 420 
2015, for a similar argument relating to the role of ‘kinesthetic attunement’) during on-line 421 
movement control. Indeed, an elite trampolinist in Hauw & Durand’s (2007) study sought to 422 
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avoid injury (as a result of poor execution) by using kinaesthetic feedback to survey body 423 
position and the tautness and flexibility of the trampoline bed. According to Jackson & 424 
Csikszenthihalyi (1999) performers appear to process ‘information about the fine nuances of 425 
our involvement in the activity’ in order to make ‘adjustments to what you are doing when 426 
something is not quite right’ (p. 105). The preceding evidence indicates that in tasks that 427 
require the execution of technically complex movements, which might have fatal 428 
consequences if performed incorrectly (as in the case of Cirque Du Soleil), performers must 429 
avoid the mindlessness that can accompany automatic processing by ensuring that they 430 
continue to monitor movement proficiency. 431 
Lapses during on-line skill execution 432 
Let us now turn our attention from action slips and consider how automaticity might 433 
promote lapses in on-line skill execution. These performance errors may be harder to detect 434 
than action slips as they characterize more covert forms of action that may only be 435 
recognized by the performer. For example, a musician may experience a lapse when their 436 
performance lacks the desired expressivity (such as missing a turning point in a piece where 437 
musical feeling is supposed to change) but this subtle error may only be apparent to the 438 
performer and not to the audience. A range of empirical and phenomenological evidence 439 
suggests that skilled performers tend to experience these lapses in the midst of task execution.  440 
In this section we consider how automaticity might lead to two specific lapses. First 441 
we consider how this form of information processing might reduce one’s ability to respond 442 
flexibly to performance demands in challenging conditions. Second, we discuss how the 443 
expressivity of skilled movement might be negatively influenced by a reliance on 444 
automaticity.  445 
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Performers are regularly presented with challenging conditions (not necessarily 446 
dangerous as in the previous section) – but ‘situations whose fine grained structure hasn’t 447 
been previously experienced’ (Christensen et al. in press, p. 24). Even Dreyfus and Dreyfus 448 
(1986; leading proponents of intuition in high-level skill) admit that few if any situations ‘are 449 
seen as being of exactly the kind for which prior experience intuitively dictates what move or 450 
decision must be made’ (p. 37). If this is the case then few situations encountered by the 451 
expert can be so similar to past experience that intuition or automaticity can be relied upon 452 
(Christensen et al. in press). These new situations will inevitably possess a degree of 453 
complexity and unpredictability that requires some form of evaluation (i.e., deliberation), 454 
heightened awareness, or subtle adjustments to movement or action in order to meet 455 
contextually-contingent demands. Bicknell (2012) discusses this issue in relation to expert 456 
mountain-biking and argues that an embodied understanding of skills must include access to 457 
tactical knowledge that allows riders to safely navigate challenging terrain. For instance, the 458 
rider might use imagery (based on previous experience of racing a route) to anticipate and 459 
prepare for the demands that they face on an impending section of the track. Bicknell reports 460 
how one performer neglected to pay attention to their speed as they came into a drop (i.e., a 461 
step-shaped section of a track where the lower part can be up to five meters lower than the 462 
higher part) and was dismounted from their bike in a very dangerous manner. Bicknell argues 463 
that reflection and decision making are possible, and necessary, during embodied states in 464 
order to allow the performer to monitor trail conditions and bodily performance (e.g., fatigue) 465 
during skill execution. 466 
Similarly, Eccles and Arsal (2015) argue that expertise in orienteering (a sport 467 
requiring navigational skills using a map and compass to travel from point to point in what is 468 
usually unfamiliar terrain) is characterized by the use of cognitive strategies which allows 469 
participants to overcome the natural limitations of attentional resources by distributing the 470 
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planning of map information over time. For example, one performer revealed that when he is 471 
on an easy part of the course (e.g., running on even surfaces such as roads) he makes 472 
effective use of that time to ‘plan the rest of the course so we’d be…be looking at the 473 
map…at another part of the course [to be covered] later on’ (Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew, 474 
2002, p. 78). As a result, this form of cognitive control allows the performer to focus on their 475 
running form or to ensure that they avoid potential hazards rather than having to attend to the 476 
map when they reach these demanding sections of the course. Orienteers reported that a lapse 477 
might arise if they lost their position on the map. To avoid this outcome they ensured that 478 
they kept in contact with the map throughout the race.  479 
Almost all researchers who maintain that high level performance, at its best, occurs 480 
automatically also hold that in challenging situations the mind comes in to guide action. 481 
However, there are many forms of expert actions that are perpetually challenging. Indeed, 482 
even the most skilled performers are presented with unfamiliar situations which requires one 483 
to relinquish a reliance on automated procedures. For example, Macquet, Eccles and Barraux 484 
(2012) interviewed a world champion orienteer who revealed that in planning a route he had 485 
to consider a zone that ‘he didn’t yet know how difficult it will be to cross, we haven’t 486 
experienced this type of vegetation before: it’s half open and dense and low vegetation….I’ll 487 
see what it’s like when I get there; if needed, I’ll change routes’ (p. 95).  Here, the performer 488 
recognizes that challenges lie in wait and that he must remain deeply attentive to performance 489 
in order to respond effectively.  490 
Similary, performers may need to alternate between reflective and more automated 491 
actions in order to deal with challenging events that occur in the midst of fast-moving 492 
performances. To illustrate, Nyberg (2015) found that elite freeskiers monitored their 493 
rotational activity during the in-flight phase of a jump so as to ascertain “whether they will be 494 
able to perform the trick the way it was intended without adjustments or whether they will 495 
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need to make adjustments during the flight phase” (p. 115). Nyberg suggests that these 496 
performers can use their focal awareness (which is conscious and might include knowledge 497 
of their velocity and how they need to alter it) and their subsidiary awareness which is ‘less 498 
conscious’ and includes knowledge of the ‘particulars’ such as the friction of the snow and 499 
their feelings of previous jumps. These elite performers were found to navigate their focal 500 
awareness by rapidly shifting its target even in the midst of the activity itself. Accordingly 501 
performers could monitor their rotational velocity while in the air but could quickly change 502 
their awareness to take into account environmental conditions such as their position in 503 
relation to the targeted landing area.  504 
What mechanisms might allow performers to successfully shift between different 505 
modes of awareness during on-line skill execution? Rucinka’s (2014) notion of “enactive 506 
creativity” might help us answer this question. Carr (2015) has drawn on Rucinka’s work to 507 
suggest that this kind of creativity may enable the performer to ‘diversify his or her 508 
experiences and to attempt to master the opportunities provided by changing performance 509 
environments’ (p. 231). Interestingly, Carr (2015) proposes that learning to deal with unusual 510 
circumstances in an ‘appropriate and effective way – which involves creation – is a trainable 511 
skill in and of itself’ (p. 232). Future research may wish to explore this intriguing possibility.    512 
We must also consider the possibility that mindlessness/excessive automaticity might 513 
cause lapses in performance by hampering the artistic expression of skilled movement in a 514 
number of domains. Relying on habit to take over and spontaneously do what has normally 515 
worked is fine when performing routine and simple everyday tasks (buttering a piece of toast 516 
in the morning) but is unlikely to prove sufficient when performing complex movements that 517 
require expressivity. Montero (2010) considered this issue in to relation to dance and 518 
suggested that ‘performing the same piece in the same way day in and day out can result in a 519 
performance without any spark’ (p. 117). On these occasions a lapse occurs: one goes 520 
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through the motions, but the artistry is missing, and as such, the performance of such actions 521 
appears flat, insipid and uninspiring. It is like when the musician forgets a crucial turning 522 
point in a piece and so neglects to alter the expressivity of their play. To ensure that their 523 
actions possess the requisite levels of expressivity Montero (in preparation) argues that 524 
dancers evaluate the aesthetic qualities of their movements by retaining a proprioceptive 525 
awareness of their action. As Dewey (1922) notes, such conscious reflection on our 526 
movement ‘keeps that act from sinking below consciousness into routine habit or whimsical 527 
brutality. It preserves the meaning of that act alive, and keeps it growing in depth and 528 
refinement of meaning’ (p. 208). Thus reflection appears necessary if performers are to avoid 529 
lapsing into doing what they have always done, a mode of performing which precludes 530 
creative inspiration. Interestingly, Chaffin and Logan (2006) argue that performers may face 531 
a paradox in these situations. That is, performance must be largely automatic or it might be 532 
forgotten in the adrenaline rush that accompanies performing in front of a big audience and 533 
yet the performance itself is an inherently creative endeavour – not mindless repetition of 534 
overlearned movements.  535 
How might performers resolve this dilemma? Chaffin and Logan (2006) found that 536 
concert soloists attend to expressive performance cues (e.g., such as musical feelings like 537 
excitement that can be conveyed to the audience). These authors suggested that the 538 
integration of automatic motor performance and cognitive control was required to provide 539 
flexibility (i.e., to communicate emotionally with the audience and permit recovery from 540 
performance errors) and that this was achieved through the practice of performance cues. 541 
Chaffin et al describe these cues as landmarks in the mental map of a piece that the musician 542 
monitors during performance to ensure that important aspects of performance go according to 543 
plan. These cues appear to be placed at key points in the routine to act as a safeguard if 544 
performance proficiency is disrupted by memory failure or lapses in attention (that is, if 545 
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performance deviates from a plan of action). In other words, these cues may be used to guide 546 
embodied action and ensure that performance continues to evolve and result in something 547 
new. These cues may be structural (such as section boundaries in a musical piece), expressive 548 
(representative of turning points in a piece where musical feeling changes), interpretive 549 
(where interpretation requires attention such as a possible change in tempo) or basic 550 
(fundamental details of technique such as changes in the direction of bowing). Importantly, 551 
the cues allow performers to adjust their performance in order to meet the ‘unique 552 
opportunities and demands of the occasion to achieve the maximum possible impact on the 553 
audience’ (Chaffin & Logan, 2006, p. 127). Of course, we recognise that these cues are 554 
merely one aspect of what guides performers creative choices. 555 
In the current paper, we sought to draw attention to a range of empirical evidence and 556 
phenomenological description which questions the common assumption that skilled 557 
performers in normal situations rely exclusively on automated procedures. It appears that 558 
contemporary accounts of skilled performance equate automaticity with mindlessness and we 559 
echo Saling and Phillips (2007) concern that such a conceptualization ‘relegates human 560 
beings to the realm of the inflexible, unthinking robot’ (p. 17). It is important to note, 561 
however, that although we have pointed to some of the problems associated with automaticity 562 
we recognise the obvious benefits that it confers upon the performer. That is, for the most 563 
part, automatic processing allows skilled performers to execute complex skills with 564 
breathtaking efficiency.  Nevertheless, we believe it is important for researchers, practitioners 565 
and athletes to recognise that there are drawbacks associated with this facet of human 566 
cognition since this may pave the way towards training regimes that ultimately produce 567 
athletes that can both reap the benefits and avoid the pitfalls of automaticity. As Reason 568 
(1990) put it, there are ‘penalties that must be paid for our remarkable ability to model the 569 
regularities of the world and then to use these stored representations to simplify complex 570 
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information-handling tasks’ (p. 17). In the preceding sections we have shown how these 571 
‘penalties’ may occur in the form of mistakes or action slips or lapses during skilled 572 
performance. Given the propensity for skilled performers to experience these errors it is 573 
worth asking whether any can be avoided and if so, how.  Here we have taken a first step 574 
towards addressing this question by examining empirical evidence and phenomenological 575 
descriptions that put pressure on the common assumption that skilled performance is almost 576 
exclusively automatic. Let us now aim to further understand some of the cognitive 577 
mechanisms responsible for the undesirable outcomes of automaticity.  578 
Reason (1990) warns us that it is very tempting to argue that mistakes and slips 579 
originate from different cognitive mechanisms. Indeed, he indicated that mistakes arise from 580 
failures of ‘the higher-order cognitive processes involved in judging the available 581 
information, setting objectives and deciding upon the means to achieve them’ while slips 582 
stem from ‘the unintended activation of largely automatic procedural routines’ (associated 583 
primarily with inappropriate attentional monitoring; 1990, p. 54). However, if mistakes and 584 
slips did originate from different cognitive mechanisms then we would expect them to take 585 
different forms yet Reason argues that they do not always do so. For example, some errors 586 
may contain elements of mistakes in that they involve inappropriate evaluations of the current 587 
problem yet they may also demonstrate sliplike features in that ‘strong-but-wrong’ (i.e., 588 
where the inefficient behaviour is more in keeping with past practice than the current 589 
situation demands) choices are made. Reason (1990) acknowledged that the mistakes/slips 590 
dichotomy was a useful starting point for understanding human error but he also recognised 591 
that certain errors ‘fall between the simple slip and mistakes categories’ (p. 54) -  that is, they 592 
possess categories common to both. For example, a highly skilled chess player might face a 593 
truly elite performer and find that prior experience triggers a familiar but inappropriate 594 
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solution (i.e., mistake). However this solution may have helped them gain an advantage in 595 
prior encounters with less-skilled players (i.e., a strong-but-wrong action slip).  596 
In seeking to resolve this problem Reason (1990) proposed that we differentiate 597 
between slips (i.e. actions-not-as-planned”, p. 9) and lapses (i.e., “more covert error forms … 598 
that do not necessarily manifest themselves in actual behaviour and may only be apparent to 599 
the person who experiences them”, p. 9) and two kinds of errors: rule-based (RB) errors and 600 
knowledge-based (KB) errors. Reason (1990) used a host of dimensions (e.g., type of 601 
activity, focus of attention) to summarise the distinctions between these three error types but 602 
it may be particularly useful to focus on the dimension ‘relationship to change’ - given the 603 
evidence outlined in the current paper which indicates that the dynamically unfolding nature 604 
of performance environments may render athletes particularly susceptible to the perils of 605 
automaticity. According to Reason’s account, ‘skill-based’ (SB) slips might be occasioned by 606 
attentional failures such as intrusions (e.g., ironic processes) while lapses might be due to 607 
memory failures (e.g., forgetting to maintain the requisite expressivity or to remember the 608 
next step in a planned sequence). These latter errors might arise because in performance 609 
environments, knowledge relating to changes (e.g., adoption of task-irrelevant thoughts) are 610 
not accessed at the correct time – perhaps owing to attentional ‘capture’. By contrast, rule-611 
based mistakes involve the misapplication of a normally good rule, the application of a ‘bad’ 612 
rule or the failure to apply a ‘good’ rule (Reason, 2008). These mistakes can be anticipated to 613 
some extent (e.g., knowledge that an unmarked teammate may suddenly be picked up by an 614 
opponent) but the individual is unsure when the change in the environment will occur or the 615 
precise form it will take. Knowledge-based mistakes, on the other hand, are occasioned by 616 
changes that have neither been prepared for nor anticipated. Reason (1990) argued that the 617 
three error types can be discriminated according to the ‘degree of preparedness’ that exists 618 
prior to the change in the environment. He also proposed that SB and RB errors differ from 619 
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KB errors in their underlying cognitive structures. Specifically, whereas SB and RB errors 620 
occur while behaviour is “under the control of largely automatic units within the knowledge 621 
base” (Reason, 1990, p. 57), KB errors typically arise when the performer “is forced to resort 622 
to attentional processing within the conscious workspace” (p. 57). 623 
Applying this line of thinking to the evidence outlined in the current paper we suggest 624 
that at the SB level the performer is aware of the potential for moment-by-moment changes in 625 
task constraints and possesses routines for dealing with them. Unfortunately, on certain 626 
occasions, the performer fails to use an attentional check to ensure that alternative strategies 627 
are utilised. At the RB level, the performer is aware that changes in the task environment are 628 
likely but makes a mistake through the application of a ‘bad’ rule or the misapplication of a 629 
‘good’ rule. Finally, KB mistakes might arise when the performer encounters a change which 630 
falls outside the scope of their prior experience and leads them to engage in error-prone ‘on-631 
line’ reasoning.  632 
Accordingly, we suggest that Reason’s category of dimensions might serve as a useful 633 
theoretical lens for researchers seeking to better understand how various cognitive 634 
mechanisms may interact to produce errors amongst skilled performers. One important caveat 635 
to note, however, is that much of Reason’s work explored the prevalence of error without 636 
using experimental control over factors such as degrees of expertise or levels of automaticity. 637 
In one of the few studies to do so, Brown and Carr  (1989) required participants to perform a 638 
sequential keypressing task, in conjunction with a short-term digit-span secondary task, and 639 
found no evidence for the kinds of slips at transition points evident in the various tasks 640 
reported by Reason. As a result, we acknowledge the challenges (i.e., combining ecological 641 
validity with experimental control) that are likely to face researchers who wish to explore the 642 
prevalence of error amongst skilled performers. Nevertheless, we believe this is an important 643 
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endeavour if we are to better understand the mechanisms that govern thought and action in 644 
skilled movement control.  645 
Considering the interplay between automatic processes and cognitive control 646 
In discussing some of the performance errors that might arise when one is overly-647 
reliant on automated processes we have hinted at the important role that cognitive control 648 
(i.e., the functions of the cognitive system that allow people to regulate their behaviour 649 
according to higher order goals or plans; Vebruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014) might 650 
play in protecting the performer against these undesirable outcomes. In seeking to further 651 
advance this argument we echo Christensen et al.’s (in press) suggestion that athletes may be 652 
more susceptible to performance errors if they fail to shift from a more automatic mode of 653 
processing to a more attention-based mode of control at the right time during performance. 654 
Christensen et al.’s (in press) ‘mesh’ theory proposes that cognitive and automatic processes 655 
can operate together in a meshed arrangement with cognitive control focused on strategic 656 
elements of performance and automatic control responsible for implementation. According to 657 
this perspective, performers can enhance strategic focus (e.g., awareness of teammates who 658 
are best placed to receive a pass) providing they reduce attention to details of task 659 
implementation (e.g., the mechanical details involved in executing the pass). Significantly, 660 
however, this theory sees a very important role for cognitive control in skilled performance. 661 
That is, experts are often faced with complex and difficult performance conditions and may 662 
use cognitive control to evaluate situational demands and adjust lower order sensorimotor 663 
processes appropriately.  664 
We agree with Christensen et al.’s proposal that cognitive control may be required for 665 
interpretation, decision making (e.g., in practice contexts or during pre-performance routines) 666 
and responding flexibly in dynamically unfolding competitive environments (which might 667 
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include the use of cue words to enhance expressivity). In fact, many experts appear to 668 
actively avoid the excessive automaticity that has been privileged by a number of influential 669 
skill acquisition theorists because it limits their ability to respond to contextually-contingent 670 
demands and renders them vulnerable to performance errors (such as mistakes in planning or 671 
attentional lapses; see for example, Breivik, 2013; Nyberg, 2015). On occasions, deliberate 672 
control is necessary to suppress undesirable actions (e.g., passing to a poorly positioned 673 
teammate) and to enhance desirable actions (increase the expressivity of movement). 674 
Unfortunately, excessive proceduralization may prevent the expert from strategically re-675 
routing semi-automated routines (Sutton, 2007). Indeed, Sutton (2007) warns us that some 676 
conceptualizations of automaticity might be equated with inflexible or rigid processing. By 677 
contrast, he asks us to conceive of sophisticated skill memory as regulated improvisation 678 
rather than reflexive conditioning. Such a perspective acknowledges that embodied skills are 679 
intrinsically active and flexible and might help us begin to explain how performers can avoid 680 
certain performance errors. So, what higher order cognitive processes might allow performers 681 
to use attentional processes in a flexible and adaptable manner?  682 
In conclusion we would like to suggest that mindfulness approaches (involving bare 683 
awareness and attention to the present moment) might be particularly useful in achieving this 684 
latter aim.  Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that attentional performance and cognitive 685 
flexibility are positively related to meditation practice and levels of mindfulness (Moore & 686 
Malinowski, 2009). For example, Moore and Malinowski (2009) found that self-reported 687 
mindfulness (that is, reports as to the level of attention and awareness one has in the present 688 
moment) was higher in meditators than non-meditators and the former group performed 689 
significantly better on all measures of attention (e.g., stroop interference test).  By increasing 690 
mindfulness, and hence one’s cognitive flexibility, performers become better equipped at 691 
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sustaining and guiding their focus of attention, at suppressing interfering information, and 692 
deautomatising automated responses (see Chong, Kee, & Chaturvedi, in press).  693 
Such an approach may allow the individual ‘to inhibit initial, automatic responses to 694 
sensory data in order to retain flexibility necessary to react effectively to changing 695 
circumstances’ (Rossano, 2003, p. 219). Additionally, performers can be encouraged to 696 
become aware of their psychophysical states (thoughts, emotions, bodily reactions) and 697 
mindfully accept any unpleasant feelings that may arise. Instead of attempting to suppress 698 
these states the performer might use self-regulatory processes in order to recognize that an 699 
alternative plan of action is required (e.g., by starting to focus on core action components, 700 
that is, features of action previously identified as functional to task achievement; see Bortoli, 701 
Bertollo, Hanin, & Robazza, 2012). As such, mindfulness acts as a form of attentional 702 
checking allowing the performer to establish whether actions are still running according to 703 
plan and whether the plan is still adequate to achieve the desired outcome. In addition, 704 
performers might combat excessive automaticity by retaining a somaesthetic awareness (i.e., 705 
a proprioceptive feel) of their bodily movement which will enable them to identify the 706 
emergence of inefficient movement patterns. It is important to acknowledge that this mindful 707 
bodily awareness does not necessarily involve a conscious analysis of the individual 708 
components of action but would, instead, typically require athletes to pay heed to their 709 
movement and recognise when it is causing them pain, discomfort, or consistently 710 
undesirable outcomes (see Toner & Moran, 2014; 2015, for a detailed discussion). This form 711 
of mindful awareness will allow performers to identify factors that are compromising the 712 
efficient execution of desired movements and help them determine how they might execute 713 
movements with greater precision (Shusterman, 2008). Of course, it is important that 714 
psychologists seeking to enhance a performer’s attentional flexibility ensure that they avoid 715 
disrupting finely tuned attentional patterns that facilitate performance proficiency. Instead, 716 
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approaches such as mindfulness should be employed to help performers enhance attentional 717 
flexibility and avoid the mindlessness that appears to lead to a variety of performance errors.  718 
The situations faced by experts appear to have too much variability for them to be 719 
able to rely exclusively on automatic processes (Christensen, Sutton & McIlwain, in press). 720 
We have argued that performance cannot be wholly ‘autonomous’ or ‘spontaneous’ in nature 721 
as certain facets of skilled performance must be attended to in order to avoid the ‘perils of 722 
automaticity’. To support this argument, we drew on a range of evidence which demonstrates 723 
some of the errors that might arise when performers rely entirely on an automated mode of 724 
processing. Thankfully, phenomenological and empirical evidence indicates that skilled 725 
performers are quite capable of using a number of different forms of conscious processing in 726 
seeking to alter or guide movement execution (see Carson, Collins, & Jones, 2014; Nyberg, 727 
2015). Nevertheless, further research is required to examine the various ways in which 728 
performers improvise their embodied skills in the midst of skill execution. For example, 729 
researchers may wish to examine how performers use metacognitive processes (see 730 
MacIntyre, Igou, Campbell, Moran, & Matthews, 2014) in seeking to alternate between 731 
automatic and conscious processing. In addition, experts may need to be taught how to avoid 732 
excessive automaticity/proceduralisation and develop techniques (e.g., somaesthetic 733 
awareness, mindfulness) that allow them to monitor and control semi-automated routines.  Of 734 
course, too much conscious attention is not a good thing, but so is too much automaticity. 735 
Rather, our recommendation is for performers to find the right balance. We recognize that 736 
this is a challenging process but it appears necessary if performers are to retain the attentional 737 
flexibility that is required to avoid errors during the performance of complex actions in 738 
dynamically unfolding environments. 739 
Finally, a potentially fruitful new direction for research in this field concerns the 740 
possible influence of emotion on “habit memory” in skilled performers. To explain, Packard 741 
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& Goodman (2012) distinguished between stimulus-response or “habit” memory (sub-served 742 
by the dorsal striatum) and “cognitive” memory (sub-served by the hippocampus). 743 
Interestingly, research (e.g., see Goodman, Leong, & Packard (2012) shows that in certain 744 
forms of psychopathology (e.g. obsessive compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress 745 
disorder), excessive anxiety tends to activate dorsal striatal-dependent (‘habit memory’) 746 
processes at the expense of their hippocampal-dependent (‘cognitive memory’) counterparts. 747 
What is not clear, however, is whether or not this shift to habitual behaviour (or “stress-748 
mediated habit bias”; Packard & Goodman, 2012) also occurs in the case of motor skill 749 
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